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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The study of metamemory, which generally refers to
one's knowledge and awareness of memory (Flavell & Wellman,
1977; see also, Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982), first developed
in the early 1960s, and has continued unabated.

In that

early period, Hart (1965, 1966, 1967) conducted research on
the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon, a frequently studied
topic of metamemory.

However, it was not until two

influential publications in 1970 that the field of
metamemory clearly began to evolve.

The first was an annual

review article written by Tulving and Madigan (1970) and the
second was a chapter written by Flavell (1970).
In their 1970 review article, Tulving and Madigan
discussed the division between researchers of verbal
learning and researchers of memory.

Despite having the

common goal of understanding how people learn and remember,
researchers of verbal learning and researchers of memory,
according to Tulving and Madigan, tended to ask different
questions, employed different methods, and used different
terminology.

Researchers of verbal learning investigated

specific questions about learning through controlled
experimentation with carefully paced conditions and.multiple
study trials; whereas, researchers of memory examined
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questions concerning information-processing models by using
some methods similar to and some methods different from
verbal learning research (see also Keppel, 1968).

Tulving

and Madigan then proceeded to declare that the field of
verbal learning and memory had made only minimal progress
within the last century, and they forwarded the suggestion
that if there was ever to be a genuine breakthrough in the
psychological study of memory, " ... it will, among other
things, relate the knowledge stored in an individual's
memory to his knowledge of that knowledge" (p.477).
Also in 1970, Flavell, a developmental psychologist,
coined the term metacognition, meaning essentially cognition
about cognition.

Metamemory has been classified as a

subcategory of metacognition (Brown, 1978), and has been
defined as an individual's knowledge or cognition about
anything pertaining to memory (Flavell, 1985).

Adult

metamemory research and developmental metamemory research
have continued to beneficially influence one another.

In

particular, developmental metamemory researchers such as
Flavell and Brown have influenced adult metamemory research
theory and terminology.
Flavell (1979) later conceptualized two key components
of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive
experiences.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to knowledge or

beliefs about what factors act and interact to affect the
course and outcome of cognition.

He categorized this
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knowledge into person knowledge, task knowledge, and
strategy knowledge.

With respect to metamemory, person

knowledge encompasses everything a person knows about the
memory of other people as well as what he/she knows about
his/her own memory.

Task knowledge refers to what a person

knows about memory in relation to specific tasks, and
strategy knowledge is all information pertaining to the
effectiveness of various methods of learning.

Flavell

emphasized that most metacognitive knowledge involves
interactions or combinations among two or three of these
types of knowledge.

For example, you might believe that you

(unlike someone you know) should use a particular strategy
(as opposed to a second strategy) for a certain task (as
contrasted with a different task) .
Flavell (1979) introduced the term "metacognitive
experiences" to refer to occasions during cognitive
processing when new insights about cognition arise (cf.
Schneider & Pressley, 1989).
the concept.

An example may help clarify

An individual learning a list of items may

experience a momentary feeling that he or she is not going
to remember a number of the items on a later test of memory.
Although the individual may possess the metacognitive
knowledge that people rarely remember all the items on a
test, the sudden feeling, or metacognitive experience, that
some items will not be remembered differs from metacognitive
knowledge.
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Brown {1978) also suggested that metacognition can be
divided into two broad components: knowledge about cognition
and regulation of cognition.

Knowledge about cognition is

synonymous with Flavell's {1979) metacognitive knowledge.
Regulation of cognition, however, includes more than is
defined in the term metacognitive experience.

Metacognitive

experiences are specific moments of insight, whereas
regulation of control is thought to be integral to cognition
in general.

Regulation of control refers to the planning,

monitoring, and checking of cognition {Brown & Palinscar,
1982).

Brown suggests that knowledge about cognition and

regulation of cognition recursively support one another, and
that attempts to separate the two lead to oversimplification
{Brown & Palinscar, 1982; see also, Cavanaugh & Perlmutter,
1982) .
Nelson and Narens {1990) recently provided an overview
of adult metamemory which focused on certain aspects of the
regulation of memory.

Memory processing generally is

thought of in terms of the acquiring, retaining, and
retrieving of information.
to this as the object-level.

Nelson and Narens {1990) refer
They distinguish the object-

level from a second level of memory processing, the metalevel, which they refer to as a dynamic model of the objectlevel.

Less abstractly, the meta-level can be thought of as

metacognitive knowledge pertaining to the acquiring,
retaining, and retrieving of information.
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Nelson and Narens (1990) suggest that the object-level
and the meta-level interact with each other through two
processes: monitoring and control.

Monitoring refers to an

individual's ability to tap into the state of the objectlevel, and control refers to any attempt by an individual to
influence the object-level.

Figure 1 provides a way to

organize the interaction of the meta-level with the objectlevel.

Figure 1 is not intended to be a theory of

metacognition, but rather is intended to aid
conceptualization and understanding of adult metamemory
research.
Monitoring

Monitoring, as defined by Nelson and Narens (1990),
consists of the meta-level being informed by the objectlevel.

Four measures have been used by researchers to

investigate the monitoring of information.

First, research

has focused on ease of learning (EOL) judgments, wherein
subjects are asked to rate how difficult a given item is to
learn (e.g., Underwood, 1966).

Second, researchers have

asked subjects during or following study to judge whether
they have learned a given item well enough to recall it on a
later test; this has been termed both a judgment of knowing
(JOK)

(e.g., King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980) and a

judgment of learning (JOL)

(e.g., Leonesio & Nelson, 1990).

Third, subjects have been asked to make feeling-of-knowing
judgments (FOKs), which are predictions of whether a
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Figure 1
The Flow of Information From the Meta Level
and the Object Level
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currently nonrecallable item will be recalled on a
subsequent retention test, such as a recognition test (e.g.,
Hart, 1965}.

Finally, researchers have examined subjects'

confidence judgments (CJs}, wherein subjects judge the
probability that a given answer is correct (e.g.,
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1977}.

Although

considerable metamemory research has focused on FOK
judgments and CJs, this research is only minimally related
to the on-going study process, since both judgments are made
following attempts to recall previously-studied items.
Because the focus of the present study is on study time
allocation, emphasis will be placed on research involving
EOL judgments and JOKs, which ostensibly are pertinent to
on-going study.
EOL judgments are usually made prior to study; the
defining characteristic of an EOL judgment is that the
subject is specifically assessing the difficulty to learn a
particular item.

It has been shown that subjects are

rather adept at predicting which items are easy and which
items are difficult to recall (Lippman & Kintz, 1968;
Underwood, 1966}.

Underwood (1966} demonstrated that, in

addition to being correlated with eventual recall, subjects'
EOL judgments were substantially correlated with various
item characteristics such as pronounceability and
meaningfulness (cf. Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982}.

Thus, it

is plausible that EOL judgments are based primarily on item
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characteristics.
In addition, at least for simple to-be-learned items,
EOL judgments do not differ substantially when subjects are
required to make immediate decisions and when subjects are
allowed considerable time to decide (Zechmeister & Bennett,
1991).

Thus, subjects appear to be able to process relevant

information quickly when making EOL judgments.
Whereas an EOL judgment focuses on an item's perceived
difficulty, a JOK focuses on the degree to which a given
item is known or has been learned by the subject.

In this

latter case, subjects are asked to judge the likelihood of
recalling a studied item either during or after study, but
before a test of memory.

Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) were the

first to demonstrate that subjects could make accurate JOKs.
In their study, subjects learned lists of five pairedassociate items.

Each pair was studied for 3 s.

After all

the pairs had been presented, one of the five items was represented and subjects rated the likelihood that they would
remember the pair.

Subjects marked an "x" on a horizontal

line containing five bars equally spaced and the phrases
"very likely" and "very unlikely" printed on either side.
As subjects' likelihood predictions increased so did their
recall for all serial positions except the fifth, for which
recall was consistently high for all ratings.
Cuddy concluded that

11

•••

Arbuckle and

Ss could reliably predict at time

of presentation of an item whether they would recall it" (p.
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130) .
Researchers subsequently have identified a number of
factors within the learning situation that allow subjects to
make JOKs even more accurately.

One factor is the presence

of test trials. King et al. (1980) showed that accuracy of
JOKs was considerably greater when subjects were given test
trials during study than when subjects were not given test
trials.

Lovelace (1984) replicated this finding and further

suggested that another factor, multiple study trials,
enhances JOK accuracy.

Prediction accuracy was shown to

increase as the number of study trials increased, although
the total study time remained the same.

More recently,

Nelson and Dunloskey (1991) demonstrated that JOKs made
following a brief delay were substantially more accurate
than JOKs made immediately after study.
In interpreting the basis of JOK accuracy, Arbuckle and
Cuddy (1969) suggested that their subjects relied upon the
perceived difficulty of the items.

In other words, they

felt that JOKs were actually EOL judgments.

The possibility

that JOKs are based on the same information as EOL judgments
was investigated by Zechmeister, Christensen, and Rajkowski
(1980), and Leonesio and Nelson (1990).

Both studies

revealed that the two types of judgments are moderately
correlated, although subjects' JOKs are better predictors of
recall than subjects' EOL judgments.
One possible explanation of the moderate correlation
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between EOL judgments and JOKs is that EOL judgments are
made prior to study and are based almost completely on item
characteristics, whereas JOKs are made during· or after study
and use item characteristics as well as information provided
from the on-going learning process.

The results of Leonesio

and Nelson's (1990) study support this position.

JOKs were

significantly more accurate than EOL judgments when items
were learned to a criterion of four correct recalls, but
were not significantly more accurate when items were learned
to a criterion of one correct recall.

Apparently, increased

study leads to greater disparity between EOL judgments and
JOKs.
The results of the studies by King et al. (1980), and
Lovelace (1984) provide additional evidence that EOL
judgments are primarily based on item characteristics and
JOKs are based both on item characteristics and information
from on-going study.

In both studies, subjects studying

without test trials were able to predict significantly above
chance which items would be recalled; however, subjects
studying with test trials predicted which items would be
recalled substantially better.

In both studies, moreover,

subjects studying with test trials remembered which items
were and which items were not recalled on the trial
immediately preceding the prediction trial, and apparently
used this information as a basis for their prediction.
These results are consistent with those of Gardiner and Klee
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(1976), who demonstrated that subjects can accurately
recognize which items were recalled and which items were not
recalled on a previous study trial.

Shaughnessy (1981)

interpreted the findings of King et al. (1980) as suggesting
that in the absence of retrieval attempts prior to
prediction, the most probable basis for JOK accuracy is
perceived item difficulty.
A final study which has investigated the role of item
characteristics in predictive accuracy was conducted by
Cohen (1988).

He examined the accuracy of subjects' JOKs

for nonverbal items.

Subjects were presented with a list of

words or a list of subject-performed tasks (SPTs) .

An

example of a SPT would be picking up a toothpick and
breaking it.

In one experiment, the items were presented

either once or twice.

Subjects recalled comparable amounts

of words and SPTs, and recalled more twice-presented items
than once-presented items.

For both words and SPTs,

subjects were able to predict that twice-presented items
would be better recalled than once-presented items.
Subjects were also able to predict reliably which words
would and would not be recalled; however, they were
completely incapable of predicting which SPTs would and
would not be recalled.

One interpretation of these results

is that subjects can effectively monitor on-going study
(once-presented or twice-presented items) regardless of the
type of item, and subjects can effectively use item
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characteristics of verbal items as a basis for their
judgments, but subjects are incapable of deriving any
meaningful predictive information from SPT item
characteristics.

Nevertheless, more research is needed to

clearly delineate the processes underlying metacognitive
judgments of SPTs, as well as those of verbal items.
Control

It seems probable that a learner's decisions within a
learning situation depend on his/her ability to monitor the
learning process.

The decisions that a learner makes to

influence the learning process have been defined as control
processes.

Some concrete examples of control are:

allocating more study time, increasing effort during study,
terminating study, self testing, choosing a specific memory
search, and terminating the memory search (see Figure 1) .
A limited amount of research has focused on the
learner's decisions to control the acquiring, retaining, or
retrieving of information.

One reason for this is that

control processes are dependent on metacognitive knowledge,
as well as on the immediate monitoring of information.

As a

result, it is difficult to locate those factors accounting
for differences in control.

For example, a researcher might

hypothesize that good learners increase effort during study
of more difficult material, whereas poor learners do not.
If this were found to be the case, it would be unclear if
the differential effect was due to differences in control
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(good learners are able to increase effort whereas poor
learners can not), monitoring (good learners are better able
to recognize difficult material), or overall meta-level
knowledge (good learners know that difficult material
requires more effort whereas poor learners do not) .

In this

example it may be difficult to know exactly what is
accounting for the increased effort on the part of the good
learner; however, valuable information can still be gained
from examining the entire control process.

The discovery of

overall metamemory relationships, between metamemory and
learning ability in this example, could provide a starting
point, which could be followed up with more analytic
research.
One of the earliest studies to investigate subjects'
control of study time was conducted by Zacks {1969).

She

asked subjects to study lists of paired-associate items in
one of two ways.

Subjects studied under either the

experimenter's control (2-s rate study/test) or under the
subject's control of study and test trials (selfpresentation).

Subjects studying under their own control

studied difficult pairs longer than less difficult pairs.
There was no significant difference in overall recall
between experimenter-paced study and subject-paced study.
Recent research has begun to focus more directly on the
relationship of monitoring judgments and control.

Nelson

and Leonesio (1988) asked subjects to make EOL judgments
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prior to a study trial during which subjects were allowed to
study an item for as much time as they felt was necessary.
Subjects were later given a cued-recall test.

It was

hypothesized that there would be an inverse relationship
between EOL judgments and study time allocation.

That is,

items judged to be difficult to learn should be allocated
more study time than items judged to be easy to learn.

This

was termed the "monitoring-affects-control hypothesis" (p.
678).

It was further hypothesized that the extra study time

given to more difficult pairs would result in complete
compensation, whereby equal amounts of easy and hard items
would be recalled.

This was termed the "complete

compensation hypothesis" (p. 678).

The monitoring-affects-

control hypothesis was in fact supported by their results,
but the complete compensation hypothesis was not.

Subjects

did allocate more study to items judged to be more difficult
to learn, but items judged to be more difficult were still
recalled significantly less than items judged to be less
difficult.

Nelson and Leonesio (1988) were struck by

subjects' inability to master every item even when study
time was unlimited.

Nelson and Narens (1990) later

suggested, "Future research should determine whether the
same or different results occur during multitrial
acquisition, because people routinely learn information to
mastery, and this needs to be reconciled with the Nelson and
Leonesio findings" (p. 8) .
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Mazzoni, Cornoldi, and Marchitelli (1990) investigated
the relationship between JOKs and study time allocation.

In

one experiment, subjects were initially presented a noun
pair for 2.5 s, 5 s, or 7.5 s, and then they were given 5 s
to make a JOK.

Following the JOK, subjects were allowed to

restudy the pair for up to 15 s.

When items were initially

presented for 2.5 s or 5 s, items rated as most likely to be
recalled were allocated less study time than items rated as
least likely to be recalled; this is consistent with the
relationship between EOL judgments and study time found by
Nelson and Leonesio (1988) .

In contrast to these results,

when the initial presentation was 7.5 s, items which
received a rating of 3 (5-pt scale), meaning they were
"uncertain about subsequent recall," were allocated the most
study time; items judged least likely to be recalled or most
likely to be recalled were allocated roughly the same amount
of study time.

More research is needed to examine the

various factors influencing the control of study time.
Metamemory-Memory Relationship

One of the main motivations for research on metamemory
has been the theoretical conviction that there are important
relationships between knowing about memory and memory
performance (Schneider & Pressley, 1989).

Cavanaugh and

Perlmutter (1982), however, reported that developmental
research has yielded only moderate or low correlations
between metamemory and memory performance.

Developmental
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research on the metamemory-memory relationship includes
correlations between memory performance and a variety of
metamemory indices such as knowledge of strategy
effectiveness, strategy use, and predictive accuracy.
Schneider and Pressley (1989) suggested that some indices of
metamemory appear to exhibit correlations with memory
performance more consistently than others.

For example,

spontaneous use of study strategies, such as rehearsal,
tends to be more consistently correlated with memory
performance than is predictive accuracy.
Nearly all adult metamemory studies investigating the
memory-metamemory relationship have focused on showing a
relationship between predictive accuracy and memory
performance.

For instance, in Lovelace's (1984) study

subjects made JOKs for associative word pairs after one or
multiple study presentations.

For each condition, he

correlated predictive accuracy with the total amount
recalled.

A significant correlation between predictive

accuracy and learning ability failed to emerge in any of the
conditions.

Lovelace (1984) suggested that the

experimenter's control over study trials may have precluded
a relationship between memory performance and predictive
accuracy.

In other words, memory-metamemory relationships

may be prevented if the memory prediction is not allowed to
influence study.

He suggested that a self-paced task would

allow possible metamemory differences to influence memory
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performance.
More recently, Kearney and Zechmeister (1989) directly
investigated the relationship between learning ability and
metamemory performance.

Their procedure consisted of

administering an initial learning task, having subjects make
EOL judgments for a second list of items, and finally having
them study and recall this second list of items.

Good and

poor learners were distinguished based on the initial
learning task.

Despite considerable differences in learning

ability there were no apparent differences in the predictive
accuracy of good and poor learners.

Kearney and Zechmeister

(1989) reasoned that perhaps differences between good and
poor learners would emerge if subjects were given an initial
attempt to learn the items.

In the second and third

experiments of their study, subjects studied the items (2 or
5 study trials) prior to making EOL judgments.

Once again,

subjects were able to make EOL judgments above chance, but a
clear difference between good and poor learners' EOL
accuracy failed to emerge.
Maki and Swett (1987) also found no correlation between
predictive accuracy (JOKs) and number of narrative text idea
units recalled. In contrast, Maki and Berry (1984) found
that subjects who scored higher than the median performance
on a multiple-choice memory test were more accurate at
predicting future test performance for sections of written
text than were subjects who scored below the median.

Also,
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Shaughnessy (1979) demonstrated that students who received
higher scores on a classroom test made more accurate
confidence judgments of whether a given test answer was
correct.
In a recent developmental study by Dufresne and
Kobasigawa (1989), the responsibility of monitoring and
controlling the learning process was left up to the learner.
Children (grades 1, 3, 5, and 7) were asked to study hard
and easy items in a self-paced manner.

Older children

(grades 5 and 7) studied the hard items for more time than
they did the easy items whereas younger children (grades 1
and 3) did not.

Although it has been suggested that

ability-related differences are not the same as age-related
differences (Kurtz & Weinert, 1989), a design similar to
Dufresne and Kobasigawa's may expose metamemory differences
related to learning ability.
In summary, no adult studies investigating standard EOL
judgments or JOKs have found a substantial relationship
between predictive accuracy and learning ability.

The one

study conducted by Maki and Berry (1984) that did find a
relationship between predictive accuracy and total amount
recalled asked subjects to make a more complex prediction.
Subjects were not asked to simply indicate how hard they
felt an item was to learn or if they felt an item had been
learned.

Instead, subjects were asked to infer from a

written paragraph whether they would be able to accurately
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answer a multiple-choice test focusing on the given
paragraph.

This task may involve a more careful integration

of the provided information than is required in standard
predictive tasks.

Perhaps differences between good and poor

learners emerge not in the monitoring of information, but
rather in the integration of that information with overall
metacognitive knowledge, and in subsequent metacognitive
decision making.
The Present Study

Adult metamemory research has focused primarily on
subjects' ability to make predictions, such as how difficult
an item is to learn (EOL judgment), or whether a given item
has in fact been learned sufficiently well to be recalled on
a later test (JOK) .

Research of this type has proven quite

informative; however, as mentioned above, little is known
about how these predictions relate to the learning process.
Moreover, research focusing on metamemory predictions has
yet to demonstrate clearly whether prediction accuracy is
related to learning or memory abilities.

The purpose of the

present study was to examine general issues of metamemory
while focusing on possible relationships between learning
ability and metamemory.

This was accomplished by

investigating a control process, namely, the allocation of
study time.
The general method used in the present series of
experiments required the discrimination of good and poor
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learners.

This was done in each experiment using scores

from an initial learning task performed prior to the main
experimental task.

Specifically, subjects first were given

s min to study 20 paired associates, followed by a 3-min
filler task, and a cued-recall test.

The results of this

cued-recall test served as the basis for distinguishing
between good and poor learners following the experiment.
After the initial task had been completed, subjects were
asked to learn a second list of 36 word pairs, 18 difficultto-learn and 18 easy-to-learn pairs (cf. Underwood, 1982).
In each experiment subjects studied the pairs using a
computer which was programmed to provide self-paced study.
The procedure for the critical task was as follows.
Subjects were randomly presented each of the word pairs for
2 s (familiarization trial), then the word pairs were
presented for 5 s in a new random order.

After each 5-s

presentation, the subject was asked whether he\she knew the
word pair.

If the response was "yes" the word pair was

dropped from the list.

If the response was "no" the word

pair remained in the list for further study.

Number of

study presentations before a "yes" response was an important
dependent variable.

Following study, subjects were asked to

perform a brief filler task and then were given a cuedrecall test.

Number of word pairs recalled was the second

major dependent variable.

This basic procedure allowed for

the investigation of subjects' study time allocation as a
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function of various experimental variables, while
simultaneously allowing the examination of possible
study/recall differences between good and poor learners.
Metamemory research has provided minimal information
about a learner's control of the learning process.

Subjects

do tend to study more difficult material longer than less
difficult material (Zacks, 1969), and subjects' EOL
judgments (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988) and JOKs (Mazzoni et
al., 1990) reflect this sensitivity to item difficulty.

It

is unclear, however, what impact this differential
allocation has on eventual recall.

Furthermore, research

investigating study time allocation (Mazzoni et al., 1990;
Nelson & Leonesio, 1988) has not allowed subjects to study a
given item more than once.

As suggested by Nelson and

Narens (1990), research focusing on unlimited multi-trial
learning is needed.

Finally, research is needed on how

subjects' control of learning processes is affected by
factors, such as test opportunities, that have been shown to
enhance metamemory predictions.
These general metamemory issues were addressed in the
present series of experiments.

Specifically, half of the

pairs on the critical list had been previously shown to be
more difficult to learn than the other half (cf. Underwood,
1982).

Consequently, the amount of study time allocated to

hard and easy items as well as the number of hard and easy
items eventually recalled could be easily tabulated.

It was
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expected that hard items would be studied more than easy
items; of interest was whether this differential study time
allocation would compensate for inherent item difficulty,
allowing roughly equivalent recall between easy and hard
items.

In addition, factors known to enhance JOKs, such as

test trials (Exp. 2) and delay (Exp. 3), were manipulated to
see if they would enhance the allocation of study time and
influence later recall.
The primary focus of the present study, however, was on
the relationship of metamemory and learning ability.

As was

pointed out, adult metamemory research has provided meager
evidence of a relationship between metamemory and learning
ability.

One reason that has been suggested for the lack of

a relationship is that learning is often experimentercontrolled (Lovelace, 1984).

In these situations,

metamemory predictions can have little effect on study time
allocation and, consequently, no indirect effect on recall.
One solution is to allow subjects to regulate their own
study (self-paced study).

This was the approach taken in

the present study.
A second reason that metamemory differences between
good and poor learners may not have emerged is that
metamemory research has focused primarily on predictive
accuracy, which usually measures the ability to make
relative judgments between the items.

Perhaps both good and

poor learners can make relative distinctions between which
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items are more difficult or which items are better known
(see Kearney & Zechmeister, 1989), but only better learners
can effectively integrate these judgments with metamemory
knowledge obtained during attempts to control learning.

If

this were the case, a relationship between learning ability
and metamemory, which was absent for metamemory predictions,
would emerge when control processes were investigated.
In the first experiment of the present study, possible
differences between good and poor learners were investigated
by examining the allocation of study time for hard and easy
items, and the sufficiency of study as indicated by recall.
Possible differences between good and poor learners were
further investigated by examining the relative benefit on
metamemory decisions of factors such as test trials (Exp. 2)
and delay (Exp. 3) .

It was expected that good learners and

poor learners would benefit differently.

Thus, the present

study provided a sensitive test of whether good and poor
learners differ in their metamemory decision making.

CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1
Method

Subjects
Forty-one introductory psychology students enrolled at
Loyola University Chicago participated in the experiment.
Each received course credit for participating.
Materials
Subjects were tested using an IBM-compatible computer.
Two lists of paired associates were used.

List 1 consisted

of 20 word pairs of moderate difficulty according to
Underwood's (1982) norms.

The second list consisted of 18

pairs of high difficulty and 18 pairs of low difficulty.
All words were five letters in length and each pair
consisted of an uncommon word as the left-hand member and a
fairly common word as the right-hand member.

Sample pairs

are: totem-wives, lares-black, and fugue-fifty.
Procedure
All subjects were given a stack of flash cards, each
containing one of 20 associative word pairs that comprised
List 1.

They were given 5 min to study the word pairs and

were informed that they would be given a cued-recall test
following study and a brief delay.
24

This provided a-means to
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discriminate good and poor associative learners as well as a
warm-up to the main experimental task.

A 3-min filler task

(math problems} was given following study and before the
cued-recall test.
Following the cued-recall test on List 1, each subject
was introduced to the main task using a brief computerpresented sample list.

List 2 learning did not begin until

subjects reported understanding the task.

Subjects studied

the second list of associative word pairs using a procedure
identical to that used for the sample list, except that new
items were used.

All word pairs were initially presented

for 2 s, one item above the other.

Thereafter, each pair

was presented on the screen (one over the other} for 5 s,
followed by a 3-s period in which only a prompt was on the
screen which read, "Do you know the word pair? (Yes =
terminate study, No= continue study}".

If subjects

responded "yes" by striking a specified computer key, the
word pair was dropped from the study list.

If subjects

responded "no", the word pair was retained for further
study.

The next word pair was presented inunediately

following the subject's response.

If a response was not

made during the 3-s period the word pair was kept in the
list for further study.

The word pairs continued to be

presented for study until each word pair had been dropped
from the study list.

Once again a 3-min filler task (math

problems} was administered after study, and was followed by
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a written cued-recall test.
Results and Discussion

Good and poor learners were distinguished on the basis
of List 1 recall via a median split.

Mean proportion

recalled was .83 for good learners and .33 for poor
learners.

One subject was randomly dropped to attain an

equal number

<n

= 20) of subjects in each group.

A 2 (good

vs. poor learner) x 2 (easy vs. hard item) mixed design
ANOVA was used to analyze number of study presentations
allocated for List 2 as well as amount recalled.

An

alpha

level of .OS was used for all tests.
Mean study trials and mean proportion recall for List 2
learning are summarized in Table 1.

Subjects compensated

for item difficulty by allocating significantly more study
time to hard items than to easy items, E(l,38) = 53.09, MSe
=

.16.

Also, poor learners studied for more study trials

than good learners (see Table 1), although the difference
was not significant, E(l,38) = 3.03, MSe = 3.10.
Furthermore, there was no interaction between item
difficulty and learning ability for amount of study, E(l,38)
< 1,

MSe = .16.

Table 1 reveals that good and poor learners

compensated similarly for item difficulty; both allocated
more study presentations to hard items.
Easy items were recalled better than hard items,
E(l,38) = 43.49, MSe = 2.70, and good learners recalled more

than poor learners, E(l,38) = 11.35, MSe = 45.37.

There was
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Table l

Hean Study Trials and Prgportion Recalled <Exp. l)
Good Leamer
Measure
Study
Trials

Proportion
Recalled

Easy Items

Hard Items

2.55 (. 78)

3.21 (l.2)

.37 ( .12)

.30 ( .14)

PQQr

lasy Items
3~25

Learner

Bard Items

(1.3)

3.87 (l. 6)

.23 ( .13)

.16 ( .15)

28
no interaction between item difficulty and learning ability
for items recalled, E(l,38)

<

1, MSe

=

2.70.

Inspection of

Table 1 reveals that neither good nor poor learners studied
sufficiently; mean proportion recall ranged from .16 to .37.
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with
previous research (e.g., Leonesio & Nelson, 1988): Subjects
studied the hard items more than the easy items, but the
easy items were recalled better than the hard items even
when multiple study trials were available.

Although good

and poor learners exhibited similar compensatory study
strategies, neither group compensated sufficiently.

Easy

items were still recalled more than hard items, and even in
the best condition, when good learners studied easy items,
only about one-third of the word pairs were successfully
recalled.

When study time was unlimited, subjects

terminated study prior to learning even half of the items.

CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of the first experiment revealed that even
though subjects compensated for item difficulty by studying
hard items more than easy items, hard items were still
recalled less than easy items, and overall recall was poor.
More importantly, no significant study differences emerged
between good and poor learners, despite markedly disparate
learning ability as indicated by both initial and final
recall.

In the second experiment, the presence of test

trials during study was manipulated to examine the effect of
testing upon metamemory decision making.

Previous research

shows that test trials can improve JOKs (King et al., 1980).
Thus, a relationship between testing (presence and absence)
and decisions to terminate study was expected.
There are at least two plausible explanations for why
test trials enhance predictive accuracy.

The most

parsimonious explanation is that test trials provide direct
information concerning the state of the memory trace.
other words, performance on a test trial provides an
indication of whether in fact an item has been learned.
There is evidence that recall on a trial immediately
preceding the prediction trial is used by subjects .when
29
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making JOKs in a multi-trial learning task (King et al.,
1980; Lovelace, 1984).

A second viable explanation is that

learners are consistently overconfident when making
metamemory predictions (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, &
Lichtenstein, 1977) and test trials improve recall (e.g.,
Runquist, 1986), thus providing closer approximation to the
inflated estimates.

However, Shaughnessy and Zechmeister

(1992) recently demonstrated that test trials improved
predictive accuracy (JOKs) when the overall amount of recall
was controlled.

Therefore, the second explanation alone

cannot account for the improvement in JOK predictive
accuracy.
In the second experiment, test trials were provided
during study via an anticipation procedure.

This procedure

was expected to improve recall indirectly by improving
metamemory decision making.

Moreover, possible

relationships between metamemory and learning ability were
further explored by examining the benefit of test trials.
It was of interest whether test trials are differentially
effective for subjects of different ability.

That is, do

good and poor learners benefit similarly from test trials?
The second experiment addressed this question by examining
possible differences in allocating study time between good
and poor learners with or without test trials.
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Method

Subiects
Sixty-four undergraduates from Loyola University
Chicago participated in the second experiment.

No subject

had participated in the first experiment, and all subjects
received course credit for their participation in the
experiment.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedures were essentially the same
as in Experiment 1.
however.

There were two notable changes,

First, minor adjustments were made in the

instructions given to subjects.

Subjects were (a) told that

they would have to remain for the entire experimental
period, regardless of when the learning task was completed,
and (b) it was stressed to subjects that they were being
asked to attempt a very difficult task that would require
their full attention.

These adjustments were made to help

prevent possible effects of low motivation.

The second

notable change from Experiment 1 was the inclusion of a
second study condition, the "test" condition.

In the test

condition, following the familiarization trial, subjects
were presented the second list of word pairs in a random
order.

Each presentation consisted of a 2.5-s period,

during which the first word of the word pair was presented
alone, followed by a 2.5-s period, during which both words
of the pair were present.

Thus, each presentation was 5 s
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long, but divided into two 2.5-s periods.

Following the

study presentation, subjects were prompted as to whether
they knew the word pair.

The prompt was identical to that

of Experiment 1, and was presented for a maximum of 3 s.

If

subjects responded "yes" during the prompt, the word pair
was dropped from the list for further study.

If subjects

responded "no", the word pair remained in the list for
further study.

Inunediately following a response, the next

word pair was presented.

As in Experiment 1, the word pairs

continued to be presented until the subject responded "yes"
for each word pair.

Subjects were then given a 3-min

distractor (math problems) followed by a written cued-recall
test.

Thus, there were two presentation conditions: test

and no-test.

The no-test condition was identical to

Experiment 1 except for the instructional changes and
differed from the test condition only in the method of
presenting items for study.
Results and Discussion

The allocation of study during the second learning
task, as well as the number of items recalled, were analyzed
using a 2 (good vs. poor learner) X 2 (test vs. no-test
study) X 2 (easy vs. hard item) mixed ANOVA design.

Good

and poor learners were distinguished on the basis of two
median splits of List 1 recall.

One median split was

performed for the no-test condition, and one was performed
for the test condition.

Mean proportion recalled for good
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learners in the no-test condition was .82, and was .73 in
the test condition; whereas mean proportions for poor
learners were .30 and .23, respectively.
between good learners, t(30)

1.66, as well as the

=

difference between poor learners, h(30)
significant at the

~ <

The difference

=

.74, was not

.05 level.

Mean study trials and mean proportion recall for List 2
learning are summarized in Table 2.

Overall, hard items

were allocated more study presentations than easy items,
E(l,60) = 128.36, MSe = .18, and subjects in the test
condition allocated more study presentations than subjects
in the no-test condition, E(l,60) = 7.13, MSe = 5.52.
Although poor learners allocated more study presentations
than good learners, the difference was not significant,
E(l,60) = 2.53, MSe = 5.52 (see Table 2).

The three-way

interaction of learning ability with item difficulty and
testing was not significant, E(l,60) = 2.45, MSe = .18.
Likewise, the two-way interactions of learning ability with
item difficulty, E(l,60) = 1.31, MSe = .18, and learning
ability with testing, E(l,60)

<

1, MSe = 5.52, were not

significant.
Testing did interact with item difficulty, E(l,60)
9.29, MSe

=

.18.

=

Figure 2 reveals that hard items were

studied longer than easy items in both the test and no-test
conditions; however, the magnitude of this difference was
greater in the test condition.
~·

t

In other words, subjects
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Table 2

Mean Stu<Sy Trials And Pro.portion Recalled <EXP. 2)
Good Leamer
Poor Learner
Easy Items

Measure

Bard Items

Easy Items

Hard Items

NO-TEST CONDITION
Study
Trials
Proportion
Recalled

2.82 (1.1)

3.48 (1.3)

3.31 (2. 2)

.3. 89 (2 3)

.72 (. 30)

.59 (. 33)

.46 { .25)

.28 ( .20)

4.50 (1.3)

4.28 (1.6)

5.57 (2 .1)

.80 ( .21)

.58 (. 30)

.46 ( .28)

I

TEST CONDITION
Study
Trials
Proportion
Recalled

3.61 (. 89)

.es

( .17)
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Figure 2
Mean Study Trials as a Function of
Item Type and Testing
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exhibited greater compensation for item difficulty when
provided feedback through testing.

Examination of each of

the simple effects reveals that both main effects hold
across each level of the other variable.

Hard items were

studied longer than easy items both with testing, £(1,31)

=

73.41, MSe = .23, and without testing, £(1,31) = 52.83, MSe

= .12, and items were studied longer with testing for both
easy items, E(l,62) = 5.20, MSe = 2.38, and hard items,
E(l,62) = 8.44, MSe = 3.39.

Easy items were recalled more than hard items, E(l,60)
=

60.34, MSe

=

2.54, subjects in the test condition recalled

more than subjects in the no-test condition, £(1,60) = 6.15,
MSe = 41.15, and good learners recalled more than poor
learners, £(1,60) = 21.9, MSe = 41.15.

The three-way

interaction of item difficulty, testing, and learner was not
significant, £(1,60)

< 1,

MSe = 2.54, and the two-way

interaction of learner with testing was not significant,
E(l,60) < 1, MSe

=

41.15.

The two-way interaction of

learner with item difficulty also was not significant,
although it approached significance, £(1,60) = 3.15, MSe =
2.54,

~

= .081.

There was a greater difference between

recall of hard and easy items for poor learners.
The interaction of testing with item difficulty was
significant, £(1,60) = 4.93, MSe = 2.54.

While the

difference between hard and easy items was greater in the
test condition for study trials, the reverse was true for
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Figure 3
Mean Proportion Recalled as a Function
of Item Type and Testing
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recall (see Figure 3).

Simple effects analyses revealed

that easy items were recalled significantly more than hard
items both with testing, E(l,31) = 19.5, MSe = 2.00, and
without testing, E(l,31) = 39.90, MSe = 3.17.

As seen in

Figure 3, the difference was greater in the no-test
condition.

Additionally, recall was significantly higher in

the test condition for hard items, E(l,62) = 6.34, MSe =
29.80, but recall was not significantly higher in the test

condition for easy items, E(l,62) = 2.82, MSe = 27.20.
The results of Experiment 2 replicated and extended
those of Experiment 1.

The results of Experiment 2 further

reveal that learners are sensitive to differences between
hard and easy items and study accordingly.

The presence of

testing during study appeared to enhance metamemory decision
making and to improve overall recall.

This is strongly

suggested by the complementary interactions between item
difficulty and testing for study and recall.

Learners

compensated for item difficulty more in the test condition
during study, and the difference between recall of hard and
easy items was reduced in the test condition.

It would

appear that test trials aid learners' decisions regarding
when to terminate study, just as they improve decisions
about what will be remembered (i.e., JOKs).
No significant differences emerged in the way good and
poor learners allocated study time.

As in Experiment 1,

poor learners tended to study slightly (but not
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significantly) longer than good learners, yet good learners
recalled significantly more.

Most importantly, good and

poor learners were influenced similarly by testing.

Both

good and poor learners compensated more for item difficulty
if provided testing during study, and both recalled hard and
easy items more equally if provided testing.

These results

replicate and extend the paradoxical relationship found in
Experiment 1: Despite considerable differences in initial
and final recall, good and poor learners appear equally
sensitive to item difficulty and benefit equally from
testing during study.

CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 1, both good and poor learners were able
to distinguish between hard and easy items, and used this
information similarly when allocating study.

Experiment 2

replicated this finding and further suggested that test
trials during study enhance metamemory decision making and
improve the sufficiency of study.

Once again no differences

in study were apparent between good and poor learners.
Nelson and Dunloskey (1991) recently demonstrated that
a delay between study and JOKs significantly improves
predictive accuracy.

They suggested that JOKs made

inunediately following study are based on both short-term and
long-term memory information, whereas JOKs made following a
delay are based solely on long-term memory information and
thus provide a more accurate indication of what will later
be recalled.

In Experiment 3, the effectiveness of a delay

between study and the decision to terminate study was
investigated.
It was expected that, when compared with inunediate
decision making, delayed decision making would enhance study
and improve recall.

As demonstrated for test trials in

Experiment 2, it was expected that the presence of a delay
40
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following study would enhance subjects' compensation for
item difficulty during study, leading to improved recall.
Thus, Experiment 3 was designed to further investigate the
findings of Nelson and Dunloskey (1991), to provide
convergent validity for the results of Experiment 2, and to
provide another opportunity for possible differences between
good and poor learners to emerge.
Method

Subjects
Eighty introductory psychology students enrolled at
Loyola University Chicago participated in the experiment.
Subjects received course credit in exchange for their
participation.

No subject from either of the first two

experiments participated.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were nearly identical to
that of the first two experiments.

Upon arrival subjects

were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: delay or
no-delay.

The anticipation procedure used in Experiment 2

was not used in either of these conditions.

Once again the

same word pairs and initial screening task as the previous
two experiments were used.

The no-delay condition was

nearly identical to the no-test condition of Experiment 2.
In order to provide a better control for the delay
condition, two minor changes were made.

First, when

subjects were prompted as to whether they knew a given word
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pair, the first word of the word pair remained on the
screen.

Second, subjects were given a maximum of 8 s as

opposed to 3 s to decide whether they knew the word pair.
As in the first two experiments, once subjects responded
"yes" or "no" the next word pair was presented for study.
The only difference between the delay condition and the
no-delay condition was the timing of the decision period.
Unlike the previous experiments, subjects were not prompted
as to whether they knew each pair until after studying all
the pairs.

That is, subjects were first presented each of

the word pairs for 5 s and then, on a subsequent trial, were
presented the first word of each pair along with the prompt,
"Do you know the word pair? (Yes = terminate study, No =
continue study)".

The decision presentations were

administered in the same order as the study presentations,
and subjects had a maximum of 8 s in which to decide.

Once

a decision was made the next cue was presented and the
subject then had 8 s to decide whether that pair had been
learned.

If a subject pressed the key marked "yes" the word

pair was dropped from the study list.

If a subject pressed

the "no" key the word pair remained in the list for further
study.

Word pairs not dropped out were re-presented in a

new random order; study presentations always preceded the
decision presentations.
had been dropped out.

This continued until all word pairs
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Results and Discussion

As before, two main dependent variables, number of
study presentations allocated and number of words recalled
on the second cued-recall test, were analyzed.

A 2 (good

vs. poor learner) X 2 (delay vs. no-delay) X 2 (easy vs.
hard item) mixed ANOVA design was used to analyze each
dependent variable.

Again, good and poor learners were

distinguished on the basis of the first cued-recall test.
Separate median splits were performed for both conditions;
subjects in the top half were defined as good learners and
subjects in the bottom half were defined as poor learners.
Mean proportions were .74

(good learner) and .34 (poor

learner) in the delay condition, and .73 (good learner) and
.29

(poor learner) in the no-delay condition.

differences between good learners,
poor learners,

~(38)

~(38)

The

= .28, and between

= 1.24, were not significant at

~ <

.05.

Mean study trials and mean proportion recall for List 2
learning are summarized in Table 3.

Analysis of the number

of study presentations allocated revealed a significant main
effect for item difficulty, E(l,76) = 143.13, MSe = .22, but
no significant main effects for delay, E(l,76)

<

4.05, or learner, E(l,76) = 3.9, MSe = 4.05,

= .052.

~

1, MSe

=

Similar to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, hard items were
studied longer than easy items, and poor learners studied
longer than good learners, although this latter difference
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Table 3

Mean

Study Trials and Pro.portion Recalled CBXP. 3)

Good

Learner

Basy Items

M@asure

Poor Learner

Bard Items

Easy Items ·

Bard Items

NO-DELAY CONDITION
Study
Trials

3.10 (1.3)

3.69 (1.9)

3.35 (1.4)

. 4.09 (1.6)

.74 (.22)

.61 (.30)

.39 ( .26)

.26 ( .22)

(1.4)

3.47 (1.2)

4.90 (1.9)

.80 (.16)

.60 (.20)

.43 (.19)

Proportion

Recalled

DELAY CONDITION
Study
Trials

Proportion

Recalled

2.75 (.97)

.89 (.12)

3.65
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was not significant (see Table 3).

The three way

interaction of item difficulty, delay, and learner was not
significant, £{1,76)

<

1, MSe

=

.22.

Also, the two-way

interactions of learner and delay, £{1,76)

<

1, MSe = 4.05,

as well as learner and item difficulty, £{1,76) = 3.65, MSe

= .22, R = .06, were not significant, although the
interaction of learner and item difficulty approached
significance.

The difference between easy and hard items

was greater for poor learners.

The interaction of item

difficulty and delay was significant, £{1,76) = 9.07, MSe
.22.

Simple effect analyses revealed that hard items were

studied significantly more than easy items for both the
delay condition, £{1,39) = 91.63, MSe = .27, and the nodelay condition, £{1,39) = 47.6, MSe = .19, with the
difference being greater in the delay condition (see Figure
4) •

Examination of the number of items recalled on the
second cued-recall test revealed that easy items were
recalled significantly more than hard items, £{1,76) =
80.00, MSe

=

2.95, good learners recalled significantly more

than poor learners, £{1,76) = 54.97, MSe = 26.5, and
subjects in the delay condition recalled significantly more
than subjects in the no-delay condition, £(1,76)
=

26.5.

=

14.8, MSe

There was no interaction between learner, item

difficulty, and delay £(1,76)

=

2.9, MSe

=

2.95, R

=

.093.

There were also no significant interactions between
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Figure 4
Mean Study Trials as a Function
of Item Type and Delay
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learner and delay, E(l,76)
difficulty, E(l,76)

=

<

1, MSe = 26.5, learner and item

3.22, MSe = 2.95, R = .077, and delay

and item difficulty, E(l,76)

<

1, MSe = 2.95.

Although none

of these interactions was significant at the R

<

.05 level,

the two-way interaction of learner and item difficulty, as
well as the three-way interaction of learner, item
difficulty and delay did approach significance.

The

disparity between the number of easy and hard items recalled
tended to be less for good learners, and this difference was
accentuated in the delay condition.
The results of Experiment 3 are generally consistent
with those of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.

A delay

between study and decision led to significantly greater
compensation for item difficulty during study, as well as
better recall.

Interestingly, subjects in the delay

condition did not study items significantly longer; yet,
subjects in the delay condition recalled significantly more
items.

Although this finding appears to be inconsistent

with the results of Experiment 2, it must be remembered that
actual study time was not equivalent for the test (2.5-s
test/2.5-s study) and no-test conditions (5-s study) of
Experiment 2.

The only notable inconsistency between

Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was the presence of a recall
interaction between testing and item difficulty in
Experiment 2, and the absence of a recall interaction
between delay and item difficulty in Experiment 3.
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Nonetheless, in both experiments, type of study interacted
with item difficulty for study, and in both experiments
recall was substantially greater for the test and delay
conditions as compared with the no-test and no-delay
conditions.

CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The combined results of the three experiments provide
important information about adult metamemory.

These results

will be interpreted first in relation to general metamemory
issues, and second, in relation to possible interactions of
metamemory abilities and learning abilities.
General Metamemory

Adult metamemory research generally has focused on
examining the learner's sensitivity to information
influencing the learning process.

For example, studies

using EOL judgments have examined subjects' sensitivity to
item difficulty (e.g., Kearney & Zechmeister, 1989), and
studies using JOKs have examined subjects' sensitivity to
what has been learned (e.g., King et al., 1980).

More

recently, metamemory researchers have begun to focus on how
this sensitivity to learning-relevant information relates to
subjects' control of the learning process (Nelson & Narens,
1990).

This shift in focus has led metamemory researchers

to consider the sufficiency of the learner's control.

In

examining subjects' control of study time, for instance,
researchers have emphasized the amount recalled in a selfpaced learning situation (e.g., Leonesio & Nelson, 1988); if
49
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subjects are given unlimited study time and do not attain
nearly perfect recall, it is considered a metamemory
failure.

The results of the present study, also, can be

interpreted in regard to the subjects' sufficiency of study,
as well as to subject's sensitivity to item difficulty.
In Experiment 1, subjects allocated significantly more
study trials to hard items than to easy items. This finding
is consistent with previous research demonstrating that
subjects are sensitive to item difficulty when making
metamemory decisions in a self-paced learning task (Zacks,
1969).

Hard items, nevertheless, were still recalled less

than easy items despite subjects' compensation during study.
This finding, also, is consistent with previous research
suggesting that subjects do not compensate sufficiently for
item difficulty (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988).

Perhaps, the

most striking finding in Experiment 1, however, was the
surprisingly low level of recall given that subjects had
unlimited opportunities to study the material.

As a whole,

the results of Experiment 1 evoke a mixed impression of
subjects' metamemory abilities.

Subjects' sensitivity to

item difficulty reflects efficient monitoring of
information; however, subjects' failure to study items
sufficiently, despite being allowed unlimited study
opportunities, demonstrates unsuccessful controlling of the
learning process.
The results of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 suggest
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that a lack of motivation may account somewhat for the low
level of recall in Experiment 1.

The procedures used in the

control condition of Experiment 2 were identical to the
procedures used in Experiment 1 except for the changes made
to increase motivation.

Although the obtained pattern of

results was nearly identical to that of Experiment 1 (see
Table 4), the overall level of recall was much higher in the
control condition of Experiment 2.

The same pattern of

results, including the raised level of recall, also emerged
for the control condition of Experiment 3.

Thus, the

findings of Experiment 1 would appear to be stable, despite
overall recall being somewhat diminished by motivational
factors.

It should be noted, however, that recall in the

control conditions of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was
still far from perfect; mean proportion recall ranged from
.74 to .26 across both experiments.
Of greatest importance to our understanding of
metamemory in general, is the relative influence of the test
manipulation, as well as that of the delay manipulation.
Previous research has demonstrated that the presence of test
trials during study significantly improves JOK predictive
accuracy (King et al., 1980; Lovelace, 1984).

In Experiment

2, subjects who were given test opportunities during study
compensated significantly more for item difficulty than
subjects who were not given test trials.

That is, subjects

in the test condition studied hard items longer than easy
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Table 4
Comparison of Results Across Experiments
&e~all

Stu~
B2Q;le:ti~nt

~an

12ift:.

Rz

Mean 12it:f.

&2

bp. 1

Item Difficulty

.36 •

.058

.07•

.048

Type Of Learner

.34

.067

.14 •

.209

Item by Learner

.04

.oo

bp. 2

Item Difficulty

.62 •

.16 •

.064

Type of Learner

.45

• 29 •

.208

Item by Learner

.06

.06

.030

Bzp. 3

•

Item Difficulty

.69 •

.13 •

.044

Type of Learner

.32

• 35 •

.323

Item by Learner

.15

.oo

.047

Indicates difference was significant (R < .OS)
Indicates there was no systematic variation
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items to a greater extent than did subjects in the no-test
condition.

Moreover, subjects in the test condition

recalled significantly more items than did subjects in the
no-test condition.

Apparently, the presence of test trials

increased subjects' sensitivity to item difficulty and
improved the sufficiency of their study.
It has also been demonstrated that a delay between
study and prediction improves subjects' JOK accuracy (Nelson
& Dunloskey, 1991).

In Experiment 3, subjects in the delay

condition compensated for item difficulty significantly more
than did subjects in the no-delay condition.

It was also

found that subjects in the delay condition recalled
significantly more items than did subjects in the no-delay
condition.

It appears as if a delay between study and

decision increased subjects' sensitivity to item difficulty
and enhanced the sufficiency of their study, as was
demonstrated for test trials.
On the surface, it seems as if test opportunities, as
well as delayed decision making, assist one's metamemory
abilities and consequently improve recall.

Although this

may be the case, these findings must be examined further
prior to making such a conclusion.

It seems plausible that

increased sensitivity to item difficulty should improve
recall, and Experiment 2 provides evidence to support this
claim.

The presence of test opportunities significantly

interacted with item difficulty; subjects in the test
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condition studied hard items more than easy items to a
greater extent than did subjects in the no-test condition.
A complementary interaction between testing and item
difficulty was also found for recall: The recall difference
between hard and easy items was less in the test condition
than in the no-test condition.

These results would seem to

converge in support of the intuitive assumption that
improving metamemory performance results in improved memory
performance.
In Experiment 3, subjects in the delay condition
compensated significantly more for item difficulty than did
subjects in the no-delay condition.

Surprisingly, however,

a complementary interaction between delay and item
difficulty was not found for recall; the recall difference
between hard and easy items was the same for subjects in the
delay and no-delay condition.

The fact that recall was

substantially improved in the delay condition, despite there
being no evident benefit of differential study, raises the
question: What is accounting for higher recall in the delay
condition?
As mentioned in the introduction to Experiment 2, prior
research has demonstrated that attempts to retrieve a given
item directly facilitate retrieval of that item (Runquist,
1986) .

Subjects in the test condition of Experiment 2 most

probably benefitted similarly from retrieval opportunities,
although it is impossible to tease this effect out since the
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number of study trials was significantly greater for
subjects in the test condition.

Nelson and Dunloskey (1991)

suggested that subjects in their study may have attempted to
retrieve the second half of a paired-associate item when
asked to make a delayed JOK.

Similarly, subjects in the

delay condition of Experiment 3 may have attempted to
retrieve the second half of each paired-associate item when
making their decision to terminate or continue study.
Furthermore, the number of study trials was not
significantly greater for subjects in the delay condition of
Experiment 3, as compared with subjects in the no-delay
condition. (There was also no significant study interaction
between learning ability and delay.)

Thus, if subjects did

not study longer in the delay condition, and there is no
evidence of a benefit due to increased compensation, then it
is likely that subjects attempted retrieval during delayed
decision making which, in turn, facilitated recall.
Clearly, more analytical research is needed on the processes
involved in delayed metamemory decisions.
In summary, the results of the present series of
experiments can be interpreted in terms of subjects'
sensitivity to item difficulty and their sufficiency of
study.

Both testing and delay enhanced metamemory decision

making and improved recall.

It remains unresolved, however,

whether greater compensation for item difficulty is directly
related to higher recall.

It is interesting that factors
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such as testing and delay may improve recall both by
enhancing metamemory decision making and by directly
improving the quality of study.

This finding has

implications for planning effective learning in general.
Metamemory and Learning Ability

Previous metamemory research had suggested that there
were no substantial correlations between learning ability
and the ability to make metamemory predictions when the
learning task used simple verbal items (e.g., Kearney &
Zechmeister, 1989).

It was reasoned that perhaps good and

poor learners are similar in their ability to monitor which
items are harder to recall or which items have been learned,
but differ in their ability to integrate those judgments
with past knowledge and thus make appropriate decisions
during learning.
In the present study, the control of study time
allocation by good and poor learners was investigated.

It

was hypothesized that good learners study more effectively
than poor learners.

Experiment 1, however, failed to show

any differences in study allocation between good and poor
learners.

Both good and poor learners studied hard items

more than easy items and recalled more easy items than hard
items.

This finding was replicated in the control

conditions of Experiment 2 and 3 (see Table 4) .

These

results were obtained despite sizable differences in initial
recall between good and poor learners as demonstrated on the
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pretest.
In Experiments 2 and 3, factors previously shown to
benefit metamemory predictions were investigated to see if
they had a similar effect on good and poor learners'
decisions to terminate study.

As mentioned above, these

factors enhanced metamemory decision making and improved
recall.

Once again, no differences were apparent between

good and poor learners.

Good and poor learners alike

compensated for item difficulty more in the test or delay
conditions as compared with their respective control
conditions.

Furthermore, good and poor learners benefitted

similarly from testing and delay.

Overall, no significant

differences emerged between good and poor learners in any
study condition within the three experiments.

The fact that

learners who differ widely in learning ability are equally
sensitive to differences in item difficulty, and benefit
similarly from testing and delayed decision making, provides
a paradox in adult metamemory research.

Although effective

regulation of study would seem to be paramount to one's
ability to learn, no relationship emerged between learning
ability and control of study.
When studies of adult metamemory first failed to find
correlations between metamemory performance and learning
ability, researchers found the results surprising and
counterintuitive (e.g., Lovelace, 1984).

When additional

studies using different item types showed similar results,
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the lack of a relationship became more perplexing (e.g.,
Maki & Swett, 1987).

Now that studies focusing directly on

the relationship between metamemory and learning ability
have also failed to find any relationship (Kearney &
Zechmeister, 1989; present study), it is time to confront
the question of why there may be no metamemory differences
between good and poor learners in simple learning tasks.
Brown (1978) has suggested that " ... in the domain of
deliberate learning and problem-solving, conscious executive
control of the routines available to the system is the
essence of intelligent activity" (p.79).

Why has adult

metamemory research provided little support for this belief?
One possible reason for this paradox is that the
ability to learn a list of items is not, in fact, correlated
with intelligent study activity.

This seems unlikely in the

case of multi-trial, self-paced learning with highly
heterogeneous items.

It is possible, however, that the

learning tasks used to date do not place sufficient demand
on metamemory skills.
complexity.

One solution is to increase task

Clever research using more complex learning

tasks may be necessary to resolve the present learning
ability paradox in adult metamemory research.
Although the simplicity of the task may account for the
lack of general relationships between metamemory and
learning abilities, this explanation provides little insight
into why good and poor learners benefit similarly from
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testing and delay.

Brown and Palinscar (1982) revived

Piaget's distinction between " .. active regulation as part of
any knowing act, and conscious regulation and direction of
thought, the keystone of formal operations" (p. 2).

They

went on to say that young children are very capable of
regulating their activities and that some form of error
correction is part of all active learning.

What younger

children, and perhaps poorer learners, are incapable of
doing is reflecting back on their own thought or learning
and using this conceptualization to initiate more complex
cognitive strategies (Brown & Palinscar, 1982).
Accordingly, good and poor learners in the present study may
have been equally capable of using corrective information
from testing and delay, but if asked to reflect upon and
design their own method of optimizing study, perhaps good
learners would study more effectively.
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